Article:
Greying workers wanted for hire in aging Japan (Jan 1, 2007)

Author:
Chisa Fujioka

Source:
Reuters

Comment:
This article repeats the same fallacy as another one I just posted. It seems to suggest that if the elderly work longer this will help solve Japan’s labor problem. However, as there are already a lot of elderly working, this is probably not realistic. Immigrants will be needed to do the work.

The only statistic we have in this article is this one:
“Staffing agency Pasona has about 8,000 retirees signed up seeking jobs, but only 10 percent have found work, said Daisuke Nakayama, a Pasona manager whose department handles employment opportunities for senior citizens.”

Not very helpful.

The only thing really notable about this article is that despite how inaccurate it probably is, it’s been published in many different newspapers, spreading the disinformation.

Article:

Major workforce disruptions looming over Japan (Jan. 1, 2007)

Author:
Eric Prideaux

Source:
The Japan Times Online

Comment:
This article seems to suggest that one way that Japan can improve its oncoming work shortage is to employ more seniors. This is most likely not possible, as the senior labor force is already been tapped into quite a bit. According to Tekeyuki Tsuda, “… a substantial expansion in the number of elderly workers was also impossible, despite the rapid aging of the populace, because Japan’s labor participation rate for those over 60 was also quite high and had remained stable for decades.[Despite the early retirement age of 60 in Japan, 56.6 percent of those between the ages of 60-64 and 24.8 percent of those over the age of 65 are still working (1994 figures).]” Tsuda also notes that the situation is similar for females by the way. So, like it or not, immigrants are more than likely going to be the *only* way to handle the labor shortage. If Tsuda is correct, then this article is mostly in error.

Notes from the article:

1. Quote: “Come spring, the first of Japan’s 6.8 million baby boomers — born between 1947 and 1949 — will begin to retire.”

2. Quote: “To ease the strain, experts say Japan must simultaneously pull off a dizzying array of feats: Encourage seniors to work longer; coax couples to reproduce; better integrate women into the labor force and considerably loosen restrictions on immigration. Failing to do this, they say, will have dire consequences.”

Comment: As stated above the first two options have already been taken. So that leaves only the third option, immigrants.

3. Article notes the negative effect a decreasing workforce will have on the economy. Also, it will have a disastrous effect on the social services the government provides, as they will be vastly underfunded.

4. Article discusses job finding services for seniors and the positive effect of work on seniors.

5. Quote: “Whether voluntarily or not, many more Japanese will find themselves working longer due to the 2004 revision to the Law Concerning the Stabilization of Employment of Older Workers, which requires companies to gradually raise their mandatory retirement age to 65 by fiscal 2013. If everything goes as planned, not all 60-year-old baby boomers will have to retire this year.”

Comment: This is interesting, but the question is how many seniors are *already* working. This article presents *no* statistics. As Tsuda points out, already in 1994 well over half of those between 60 and 65 were *already* working!

6. Article details how government is trying to increase the birthrate of couples, and how one effective method might be by providing more services to help families raise children.

Comment: There might be something to this, but note that a declining birth rate is a problem for most developed countries now. So it might have something to do with people with wealth. Perhaps those with larger disposable incomes simply want to focus more on their own life than on raising children. This is something I’d like to look into more.

7. Quote: “… judging by a much-discussed report published in 2000 by the U.N. Population Division titled “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations?” According to the study, if Japan is to maintain the size of its population at a level of 127.5 million, “the country would need 17 million net immigrants up to the year 2050, or an average of 381,000 immigrants per year between 2005 and 2050. By 2050, the immigrants and their descendants would total 22.5 million and comprise 17.7 percent of the total population of the country.” The study went on to say that keeping the ratio of workers to retirees at its 1995 level of almost five to one would require Japan to allow in an average of 10 million immigrants a year — bringing the entire population to 818 million in 2050, with 87 percent of that total comprised of recent immigrants and their descendants.”

Comment: Incredible.

Notes on Reluctant Hosts: The Future of Japan as a Country of Immigration by Takeyuki Tsuda (pdf).

[The link to the article now turns up a blank page. Not sure if this is a temporary problem or somethign permanent. For now use this link.]

As this paper is on-line, I’m only going to give very brief notes. This is an excellent paper and I would encourage people interested in this issue to read it entirely and carefully.

1. During Japan’s rapid economic expansion, Japan seemed to get by without the use of immigrants. However, as the author puts it: “By the mid-1980s, however, Japan lost its unique status among First World countries and finally succumbed to the pressures of global migration, demonstrating that no advanced industrialized country can sustain high levels of economic growth forever without becoming dependent on large populations of immigrant workers.”

2. There were about 800,000 unskilled workers in Japan in the mid-90s and many problems emerged.

3. At around the same time Japan was becoming a popular destination for migrants, the country went into a prolonged recession. As this seemed to solve to problem albeit temporarily, interest in the issue seemed to die down somewhat. However, the dynamics that existed then still exist, and the problem has far from gone away.

4. Tsudua reviews standard reasons why Japan will need immigrants. Population declining, unwillingness of young to do the 3D work (dirty, dangerous, dull.). Also the large pool of labor just next door in poorer Asian countries. Several other reason are explored.

5. Quote: “The Structural Embeddedness of Immigrant Labor in the Japanese Economy Two important, long-term changes in the Japanese domestic economy have made Japan a country of immigration: an acute unskilled labor shortage and an increasing need for a casual and flexible labor force.”

6. Tsuda notes that the changes in the Japanese economy he discusses are long-term structural ones not likely to reverse themselves. So the need for immigrants and their inevitable presence is not something that will go away.

7. “In 1989, 46 percent of companies in the manufacturing sector were labor-deficient, and the proportion increased to 58 percent in 1990 (Ministry of Labor Secretariat 1990-1995). Many of these firms were therefore forced to employ foreign workers as the only realistic and cost-efficient source of labor power.”

8. Despite the need for foreign workers, the Japanese government refused to *openly* to admit and to allow in the presence of unskilled workers.

9. Tsuda notes that there are many side-doors through which unskilled labor enters Japan. He notes, Trainees, Students, Entertainers, and Nikkeijin as four main doors.

10. Tsuda argues that the trainee system is merely a facade for a guest worker program.

11. He takes each side-door one at a time and explains how it works.

12. Next Tsuda discusses illegal immigrant labor.

13. “When these different types of illegals are considered, the total number of illegal immigrants in Japan is probably in the 400,000 to 500,000 range.”

14. Tsuda notes that immigration does not really try to stop the illegal immigration but restricts itself to token efforts. A large portion of those caught are those who turn themselves in.

15. There is no cooperation between police and immigration officials. The police do not attempt to find and arrest illegal immigrants, though in theory they could easily do so.

16. Tsuda notes how the presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants leads to serious abuses. Also, these workers but poorly receives, if they receive at all, any social services.

17. “Because of the national government’s refusal to grant basic human rights to foreign workers, a type of “local citizenship” for immigrants is emerging (Pak 2000). However, it is an uneven, haphazard, and uncoordinated conferral of rights without firm governmental guarantees.”

18. Tsuda notes that policy making is not overly democratic, but basically formed by the bureaucracy and rubber stamped by politicians. He has particularly harsh words for the Justice Ministry.

19. Quote: “In fact, two of the most important immigration policies (the trainee program and the admission of the nikkeijin), which have supplied Japan with most of its unskilled immigrant workers, have simply been imposed as Ministry of Justice decrees without Diet scrutiny or ratification or even public notification.”

20. Quote: “Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice is one of the most conservative, closed-minded institutions in Japanese society that still operates with ideologies of ethnic homogeneity, cultural purity, and a nation-state based on jus sanguinis (the principle of blood and descent). ”

21. Tsuda makes many interesting predictions for how the inevitable presence of migrant workers will be handled. Well worth reading in its entirety. He suggests that unless Japanese policy makers wake and and put together a good policy, they will be overwhelmed by the problems uncontrolled migration will bring.

Notes from “Foreign Workers and Immigration Policy” by Hirowatari Seigo from The Political Economy of Japanese Society Vol. 2 edited by Banno Junji; Oxford University Press, 1998, pages 99 to

1. Quote: “The essence of ‘training’ activities is ‘learning’ and in this sense it is the same as for ‘college student’ or ‘pre-college student’ residence statuses. ‘Training’ is ‘learning’ at institutions other than education institutions. ‘Work’ status is not included in ‘learning’ status. Accordingly, in cases in which a training allowance is paid to a trainee receiving practical training in a corporation, should the money provided exceed actual expenses (travel, living expenses, etc.) and amount to remuneration, the employer is open to the charge of facilitating illegal work and the trainee will be punished and/or deported for illegal work activity.” (Author cites two sources for this.)

2. Quote: “The point is that this sort of training system is not being taken at face value in the community. The distinction between practical training and work is very vague and the fact that corporations who were short-staffed utilized foreign workers in the guise of trainees was an openly acknowledged reality. In August 1989 the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau released data on the results of a survey conducted from April 1988. According to the data, of the 40 companies and 547 trainees surveyed, only 5 companies were judged overall by the Bureau to ‘have no particular problems’. In the remaining cases, there were suspicions that labour shortages were being overcome; 68 trainees were not permitted to renew their residence status and 13 were given deportation orders on the grounds that they were engaged in activities outside their status.”

[Comment: Clearly this information now is nearly 18 years old. But the question is, in the interim did the government ever do anything to improve the situation?]

3. At the time of the above reports, the government had at least some form of involvement in about 70% of the trainee programs. However, in 30% there was no involvement.

4. Note that from 1985 to 1990 the number of trainees more than doubled? Why? One guess is that during this time period of rapid economic expansion, the program was being used as a means to recruit unskilled labor.

5. After the above 1989 report deliberations occurred about how to revise the law. There was clearly a grey zone between what could constitute training and what could constitute unskilled labor. The Ministry of Justice said that this grey zone needed to be clarified before the program was expanded. The Ministry of Labour said very much the same thing.

6. Quote: “Kato Toshiyuki, who appeared before the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs as a trade union representative, introduced the concept that ‘training kills three birds with one stone’. His essential criticism of the training situation was that, whereas training worthy of the name should involve huge intake costs, the fact that corporations were supposedly ‘for the sake of global goodwill . . . proactively volunteering for training’ raised the question of whether or not it was in fact because ‘there was profit in it’. On the other hand, Masuda Masaichi, director of Nikkeiren ( Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations), emphasized in his testimony Japan’s need, as an advanced economy, to promote the intake of technical trainees for the purpose of economic assistance (i.e., technology transfer) to developing nations, as long as caution was exercised in the liberalization of human resources.”

7. Author cites a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in June 1990, that out of companies responding to the survey, 10% were taking in trainees. On average each company was taking in 16.8 trainees. Breakdown according to industry looked like this:
—Electrical machinery and appliances 20.2 %
—Finance and Insurance 19.1 %
—Manufacturing and Utilities 15.8%

8. Training period times were:
— 1 to 3 months 16.8%
— 3 to 6 months 25.2%
— 6 to 12 months 23.1%
—12 to 24 months 22.7%

Comment: Exactly how long should training take?

9. Costs per month
Less than 100,000 yen 17.7%
100,000 to 150,000 yen 16.5%
150,000 to 200,000 yen 30.8%
250,000 to 300,000 yen 13.9%

10. “There were, however, many complaints on the part of small and medium size enterprises, which have the most severe labour shortages, about securing trainees. If we accept as a premiss the reasonable argument that ‘training should actually cost money’, then it does not stand to reason that anybody would want trainees, but in reality this is not the case. The Ministry of Justice took a step that fitted with ‘reality’. The ’standards regarding training’ established by a ministerial ordinance of 1 June 1990 pursuant to clause 7, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 2 of the revised Immigration Law stipulated certain requirements regarding the institutions able to offer training, which included practical training, but where the institution was the state, a local municipal body, or in other ‘cases specified by notification of the Minister of Justice’, these standards were not to apply. The subsequent ‘Ministerial Notification Regarding Training’ of 9 August 1990 prescribed Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Commerce and Industry Associations, and small and medium size enterprise groups as exceptions to the standards, with the aim being ‘to expand ways for domestic small and medium size enterprises to be involved in training programmes’. The proviso, however, was that they were required to operate the training programmes with financial and other assistance from, and under the guidance of, national and/or local municipal bodies.”

Comment: If this analysis is correct, then clearly the trainee program is just a means by which small to medium sized businesses can obtain unskilled labor.

11. Statistics for trainees:
1985 … 13,987 ( China 2,877; South Korea 1,604; Thailand 1,233)
1986 … 14,388 ( China 2,848; South Korea 2,336; Indonesia 1,114)
1987 … 17,081 ( South Korea 2,800; China 2,688; Thailand 2,428)
1988 … 23,432 ( Thailand 4,708; China 3,840; South Korea; 3,343)
1989 … 29,489 ( Thailand 4,502; South Korea 4,125; Philippines 3,974)
1990 … 37,566 ( China 7,624; Thailand 5,075; South Korea 4,485)
1991 … 43,649 ( China 10,668; Thailand 6,290; South Korea 4,439)
1992 … 43,627 ( China 15,054; Thailand 5,385; South Korea 3,717)
1993 … 39,795 ( China 15,688; Thailand 4,075; Indonesia 3,433)

12. Quote: “The use of trainees entered a new phase in late June 1991 when it was reported that agreement about post-training work had been reached between the four ministries of Labour, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade and Industry. According to the report, ‘the agreement will allow trainees to switch to a “specified activities” residence status and work for about one year after one year’s training. The proviso is that this will be limited to trainees and corporations who undertake training under the guidance of the “foreigner training association” (a working title of an organization to be set up in October 1991)’. … This idea was promptly incorporated, as the ‘Technical Intern Training Programme’, into the December 1991 Second Report on Administrative Reform Focusing on the Lifestyle of the People and Responses to Internationalization of the Ad Hoc Administrative Reform Council.”

Comment: Why should a company want to have the worker continue working after they are trained? I can only read this as an enticement for those who properly train the workers in question. That is you train the worker, then you get to use them for a year or so as unskilled labor.

13. Quote: “The combined period of the training and the technical internship may not exceed two years. The matter of a new residence status being set up to cover the period of the internship is to be looked at, but for the moment this is to be covered by the residence status of ’special activities’. Interns’ families are not permitted to come to Japan during the period of the internship, and it is expected that, in order to guarantee that interns return to their home countries, certain steps will be taken to ensure that preparations for returning home are in place, such as supervision by the corporation through the provision of accommodation facilities, a departure reporting system, and regular payments into a travel expense account by the corporation. Moreover, the Japan International Training Co-operation Organization, which was established in October 1991, has been active in arranging the Technical Intern Training Programme.”

Comment: Note the care which is taken to insure that the trainee will not establish ties and want to stay in Japan. They cannot come to Japan with their families. That’s rather hard on married people, I would think, to be away from home for two years.

14. Author’s conclusions regarding Technical Intern Training Programme: “The above issues require further monitoring. The least that can be said is that, should the intake of foreign workers proceed on the condition of one year’s training in accordance with the above-mentioned programme, it will be viewed by future generations as having happened because of short-term labour market vested interests without the consensus of the people, particularly through an act of parliament after thorough debate, and without a clear response strategy for the social and human issues that arise from immigration. The intake quota will essentially be determined by the demand of the Japanese labour market (there will, of course, be political negotiations with participating countries). Here once again we will see the principle of ‘economic growth’ taking precedence on the pretext of fulfilling our international obligations ‘as a developed economy . . . for the sake of global friendship’.”

The descendants of emigrants to South America cannot be categorized as ‘foreigners’ because of their lineage. The world trend is toward treating those carrying the blood of one’s own country the same as nationals of one’s own country to the third generation. The descendants of those who have succeeded in the country in which they settled are the ones who come, so there is little likelihood of their settling in Japan-this is the difference between them and other Asians. As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which allows emigration, is concerned, it would in fact be a problem if they were to return and settle. It would be contrary to emigration policy. In any case, so long as there is a need in Japan and in the country of origin for homecoming work by descendants of South American emigrants, it is the role of bureaucrats to make that as easy as possible.

The comment of Toda Katsunori, Planning Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Kokusai Jinryu ( The Immigration Newsmagazine) ( July 1990), 11-12.

Cited in The Political Economy of Japanese Society Vol. 2 by Banno Junji; Oxford University Press, 1998.

Notes from Challenges for Foreign Traineeship Programs in Japan by Yasushi Iguchi.

1. In the early 1990’s Japan was accepting about 40,000 trainees a year. About 25% of these trainees were funded by the government. The rest were private.

2. Out of the OECD countries, this means Japan had far more trainees than any other country. For example, the next highest number would be at about 20,000 for Germany. The UK and America have far less, ranging from 3000 to 5000 any given year. Why are there so many trainees in Japan?

3. Article notes that trainees cannot be accompanied by their families.

4. Article notes trainee programs first started in the 1960s when multinational corporations with headquarters in Japan, wanted to train local workers from other countries in Japan. This seems perfectly sensible to me.

5. Article notes four main reasons for trainees in multinational corporation case.
- i. basic education
- ii. teach knowledge on specific products and processes
- iii. encourage long term commitment
- iv. encourage a linkage between R&D in home country, and production in foreign country.

6. Quote: “September 1990 saw the deregulation of arrangements for traineeship programs in small and medium-size enterprises that do not have any affiliates or joint ventures overseas. It is now possible for them to accept foreign trainees through intermediary bodies such as chambers of commerce, local employers’ associations and certain legally recognized non-profit organizations. The number of trainees such firms can have is up to five percent of the number of regular employees the enterprise hires.”

7. For trainees of small or medium size firms, there is no guarantee of work upon returning home.

8. “Some foreign trainees might become “disguised” workers able to earn more than the training allowances currently paid in Japan. Some Japanese companies accept trainees simply to secure a workforce in occupations Japanese people are not willing to do (Japan Institute of Labour 1997a; Hanami and Kuwahara 1995; Kajita 1993; and Tezuka and Komai 1992).”

9. In the case of Chinese workers, China monitors the workers progress closely, and offers employment when they return.

10. “The cost of accepting foreign trainees through intermediary organizations is not insignificant. According to a study by the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), the initial cost of accepting a foreign trainee is ¥510,000. About 80 percent of this initial cost is to cover accommodations and expenses involved with sending their mission to Asia. The on-going cost of having a foreign trainee for one year is ¥1.79 million. That figure includes ¥1.08 million for the training allowance, about ¥70,000 for travel to Japan, ¥60,000 for utilities and ¥20,000 for off-the-job training. On the average, individual companies pay ¥1.27 million and the intermediary body pays ¥520,000 (JITCO 1997b).”

11. Here it notes that the Technical Intern Traineeship Program was explicitly to obtain foreign labor. “The introduction of the TITP was thus conceived as an alternative means of widening legal channels for accepting foreign workers while tightening the controls on illegal workers.”

Notes from The Politics of Foreign Labor Policy in Korea and Japan by Yong Wook Lee and Hyemee Pari. Published in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 35, 2005.

1. Sourth Korea (Korea) was traditionally a non-immigration country.

2. As Korea grew into a more developed economy, small and medium sized companies began to make more use of unskilled laborers from other countries. Rights abuses became widespread. In particular this was prevalent among illegal foreign workers.

3. Quote: “In this context, on July 31,2003, the National Assembly of Korea passed one of the fairly advanced pro-foreign workers legislation currently practiced in the world, the “Employment of Foreign Workers Act (EFWA),” which called for an introduction of a “work permit system.” This made Korea the third country in Asia, after Singapore and Taiwan, that adopted the EFWA, in which foreign workers are entitled to bonus allowance, retirement pay and the three basic labor rights of unionizing, collective bargaining and collective action.”

4. This is in stark contrast to Japan, in which discussion of the EFWA has never even been debated in the Diet.

5. Why was the bill successful in Korea, but not Japan?

6. Both Korea and Japan share many similarities. “Both countries have a tradition of the so-called “strong states” relatively independent from social pressures in determining policy outcomes. Self-understandings of nationhood of both countries have been historically ethno-cultural and differentialist as ethnically homogeneous countries, which are identified as important variables for state policies toward immigrants. In addition, both countries have identified social and cultural homogeneity embedded in their society as one of the elements that contributed to their postwar economic successes.”

7. The article contends that limited state action is the reason the EFWA has not been successful. “we attribute the success to the more extensive, organized pro-foreign workers coalition of state actors and human rights activists over the course of actions. When this observation is applied to Japan, the absence of an active role of the state accounts for Japan’s relative silence on the EFWA.”

8. Although the EFWA as accepted in Korea gives many rights to foreign workers, it still only allows them into the country for a limited time. It does not grant them permission to bring in their families. However, it goes soft on illegal workers, granting some amnesty and others very soft penalties. However, it tries to insure that workers will not stay for prolonged periods.

9. Since the second half of the 1980s, Japan and Korea became a significant destination for immigrants from many developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Both governments were under pressure to solve the numerous infringements on human rights that these migrations brought about. “At the center of this problem was the increasing number of illegal foreign workers. They are not permissible legally to do unskilled works but are economically significant because of their willingness to do the kinds of jobs that few Japanese or Koreans are interested in doing.” As they are not technically legal, they suffer from human rights violations. It is no longer just an issue of controlling immigration but solving the numerous problems that have come about by the already uncontrolled migrations.

10. Japan responded before Korea by passing a new set of immigrations procedures in 1989, that came into effect in 1990. These new procedures were defined in the revised Immigration Control Act. Supposedly this act gave rights to foreign workers, however, Japan still maintained a policy of attempting to keep out unskilled laborers which were desperately wanted by small and mid-sized businesses.

11. Quote: “However, in a situation where a demand for labor in Japan was great and a vast supply of labor in developing Asian countries existed, it was inevitable for unskilled foreign workers to come to Japan to find work. In order to curb employment of illegal foreign workers, the government made two channels available for de facto unskilled labor migration. One was the trainee system in the name of the Technical Internship Program; the other was the recruitment of Nikkeijin (descendants of Japanese emigrants), giving access to residential status with no restriction on employment. ”

[Here it is taken for granted that the Technical Internship Program was a means to allow unskilled labor into Japan.]

12. Japan revised the act again in 1997 and 1999, but still has not succeeded in stemming the tide of illegal immigrants.

13. Article notes that early on Korea’s policy towards immigrants was very similar, even as far as trainee programs went: “Based on the Japanese model of the “Industrial and Technical Training Program for Foreigners,” the Korean government introduced the “Industrial Technical Trainee Program (ITTP)” as a side door to bring in (unskilled) foreign workers.” By 2001, the program eventually had 100,000 participants. The program was problematic in that workers were not granted many rights that Koreans would have had. It also did not alleviate the need for unskilled laborers or help the illegal immigration problem. Not only this but the program unintentionally encouraged illegal immigration as trainees often stayed on as workers (often at different companies).

14. Illegals were treated poorly by employers, who threatened them with deportation if they complained.

15. A very long portion of the journal deals with the politics behind getting the EFWA passed in Korea. (At a later date I might try to make notes of some of this, because a lot of it might offer useful lessons for those who wish to create similar change in Japan.)

16. Quote: “Although it is difficult in this article to convey the full-blown comparison between Japan and Korea, one striking difference between the two countries is found in state actors’ responses to international migration flows. In contrast to Korea, Japanese state actors showed far less effort at pushing for rights and integration of foreign workers into Japanese society. Unlike its Korean counterpart, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Labor (one of the two principal authorities in charge of immigration along with the Ministry of Justice that has taken the hardest anti-immigration line) was fundamentally suspicious of the integration of unskilled foreign workers. Despite the fact that foreign workers (both skilled and unskilled) have already been deeply embedded in the Japanese economy, the Ministry of Labor has argued that “the admission of unskilled immigrant workers could lead to an avalanche of foreigners, who, in turn, would undermine Japan’s labor market and social cohesion.” As such, from the Ministry of Labor’s point of view, the integration of foreign workers in general and unskilled foreign workers in particular could not be seen either as a legitimate response or as a permanent solution to Japan’s labor shortages.”

17. Quote: “The role of Japanese state actors as a countervailing force is also observed in the differences between national and local governments’ responses to foreigners in Japan. While local governments tend to make steady efforts in constructing a policy of accommodation in response to the realities of Japan’s de facto emergence as a destination of international migration flows, Japan’s national government continues to be strongly anti-immigrant. It warns against Japan’s reliance on foreign workers for its labor shortages and encourages employers to offset labor shortages by improving efficiency and using labor-saving production techniques to the fullest.”

Comment: I have to review the article more closely, but I’m not convinced of their conclusions. After all who influences the state in these matters? I do think a lot of the background information presented in this article is useful though.

Reading notes for Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, published 1994 by Stanford University Press. (Note, there is a more recent edition of the book.) These notes cover pages 397 to 400 from Chapter 11, which covers Japan and is written by the editor of the book.

1. Quote: “Potentially more important in the future, especially as the pools of Latin American Nikkeijin are exhausted, is another of Japan’s currently operating backdoor immigration policies, the “company trainee” programs. In 1991, 43,649 foreigners were admitted to Japan as trainees of private companies; about the same number were admitted in 1992, mostly from mainland China, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia.”

2. Quote: “The Japanese government officially justifies the company trainee programs as a form of development assistance to poorer countries — a vehicle for skill and technology transfer. However, independent observers consider this to be diplomatic window dressing, since most of the skills acquired by company trainees are not directly transferable to jobs in their home countries unless the Japanese firms that provide the training have established subsidiaries or joint-venture plants there.”

3. It is estimated that once the Japanese economy recovers the program maybe increased to the extent that between 200,000 to 300,000 foreigners will be entering in Japan.

4. At the time of the chapter’s writing, over 500 different recruitment networks were being established between the Japanese government with the cooperation of Chinese local government councils. Similar agreements were being negotiated with Indonesia.

5. Even as the economy was in a downturn the program was expanded. Why? The author suggests the following: “The most plausible explanation is that the officials responsible for these programs, like the private employers who have come to rely upon foreign workers, are taking the long view of Japan’s labor supply situation. They do not see the domestically unmet demand for unskilled labor as being cyclical; rather, they consider it a structural feature of the Japanese economy in the last decade of the twentieth century and beyond. While the recent economic downturn may have taken some pressure off labor-short small and medium-sized businesses, these same firms remain deeply concerned about future supplies of young workers.”

6. Quote: “The company trainee approach to solving the country’s long-term labor shortage has won strong support from Japan’s business organizations, several of which have developed and presented to the government their own designs for foreign-worker training programs (see, for example, Japan Foodservice Association 1990; Tokyo Chamber of Commerce 1989).”

7. The author notes that the program was expanded in 1993. Under a new part of the program, known as the Practical Trainee program, foreigners could remain in Japan and work for up to a year and a half after receiving their training (supposedly on the job training.)

8. The Practical Trainee program “has intensified criticism of the company trainee programs, primarily by intellectuals, on the grounds that most jobs held by foreign trainees are exactly those that Japanese citizens will not do; that many employers provide very little actual training; and that most companies are simply using the trainees as a source of cheap, unskilled labor.”

9. foreign tranees during the first year are not treated as regular employees. This means they are not covered by Japanese labor law. They don’t recieve regular wages, health insurance, workmen’s compensation and other fringe benefits.

10. Quote: “Foreign trainees are, in fact, somewhat cheaper to the firm than the average Japanese employee. Employers pay no recruitment fees and have no long-term obligations to their foreign trainees. Only if the employer opts to retain a trainee for a second year and the foreign trainee passes a certifying examination given by the Ministry of Labor does he become an officially recognized employee with standard benefits and protections.”

11. Those who criticize the trainee system point out that most utilizing it are small and medium sized businesses who simply cannot offer the appropriate training, but are, in fact, in need of unskilled workers.

12. There is no enforcement mechanism in place to make sure the workers return home after their training. While some home countries, such as China, are make strong efforts to recover their workers, other countries are not.

13. Quote: “A greatly expanded company trainee system could be the functional equivalent of a quota system for immigration, but it would probably be more effective in maintaining the strict-rotation principle than a U.S., Canadian, or Spanish-style quota system. 41 The company trainee approach offers other advantages. It is attractive to employers (any Japanese company can participate if it agrees to abide by the government’s rules), is more acceptable to the Japanese public than a formal quota system, and avoids the diplomatic sensitivities of allocating visas among the sending countries that are Japan’s close neighbors. Some academic experts believe that the political difficulties raised by a formal quota system would paralyze the government bureaucracy. Therefore, expanding the company trainee program is both a more realistic and a preferred option.” [Comment: To the extent that the program is used a source for unskilled labor, it is easier to send the workers back home once they are no longer needed.]

This is part III of an outline for chapter 10 of Japan and Global Migration, published 2000 by Routledge. Part I is here. Part II is here. The title for the chapter is “Labor law, civil law, immigration law and the reality of migrants and their children.” The author is Katsuko Terasawa a practicing lawyer in Osaka. These notes cover 227 to 230, and are mostly about trainees

1. The purpose of the trainee program is to teach industrial techniques or skills at private corporations.

2. The standards of such training programs are established by the Ministry of Justice.

3. The original purpose of the program was to promote cooperation with developing countries.

4. Quote: “In reality, however, many foreign workers have been employed under the guise of trainees in order to compensate for the labor shortage. In spite of the standards established by the Ministry of Justice under Immigration Law Article 7-1-2 (Ministry of Justice Regulations no. 16, 24 May 1990), many companies force trainees to work as unskilled laborers under the pretext of being in training. In one case it was found that so called trainees were forced to weed the gardens. In another case, trainees were forced to be lavatory attendants.”

5. According to official standards on the job training should not exceed over two-thirds of the total training hours. However, a survey done in 1989 by the Ministry of Justice found that 57.7 percent of the companies required that trainees do actual work 100% of the time. There was no educational component. [Author sites Kanto Bengoshikai rengoukai (ed) 1990 “Kenshuu Jisshi Kigyou ni Kansuru Jittai Chousa Kekka” (Results of a the Survey of the Actual Conditions of Trainees in Private Enterprises), in Gaikokujin no Shuro to Jinken (Foreigners’ Working Conditions and Human Rights), Tokyo: Kanto Bengoshikai Rengoukai: 32-33.]

6. According author, citing above survey, 70% of trainees are required to do overtime training. This is basically just overtime work. Some companies force trainees to work ten hours a day and holidays.

7. Quote: “As they are not classified as workers they are not eligible for wages nor are they protected by the labor standards laws. Trainees are eligible to receive a training allowance of up to ¥100,000 (US$1,000) per month. Before 1992, the amount was ¥60,000 to ¥80,000. Employers seem to interpret this as a maximum compensation rather than a guideline for fair remuneration. According to the 1989 Ministry of Justice Survey, almost all trainees received ¥40,000 to ¥50,000 even if they worked overtime. The survey reported one case where trainees received ¥50,000 per month while Japanese workers performing the same jobs for the same number of hours received ¥280,000, more than five times the trainees’ wage.”

8. Quote: “According to a 1992 Prime Minister’s Office survey, trainees received from ¥30,000 to ¥180,000 per month.”[Source: Soumuchou Gyousei Kansatsukyoku (ed.) (1992 [1989])”Gaikokujin wo Meguru Gyousei no Genjo to Kadai” (The Present Condition and Problems of Adminstrative Measures on Foreigners), Tokyo: Oukurashou Insatsukyoku Hakkou. 103, 118]

9. Author sites a case where it was discovered that trainees were workers and immigration refused to extend their visas. Some of the trainees were deported without ever having received any training.

10. Trainees are generally not covered under existing labor laws and this is a big problem. However, in some cases if the trainee is deemed by the Labour Ministry as an actual worker, he may receive some protection, including Workers Accident Compensation Insurance. However, I’m sure this will also be problematic because the person in question would not be able to extend their training visa afterwards.

11. According to “the fifth provision of the ministerial ordinance of the Immigration Law (regulation no. 16.)”, companies must provide the trainee with accommodations of some kind. They are expected to be trained at factories near by. “In fact, however, some companies use the trainee system as a cover to access cheap unskilled labor, require trainees to work an eight hour day plus overtime and provide no educational training. The monthly wage paid to these trainees by companies found to engage in such practices ranged from a mere ¥30,000 to ¥50,000, perhaps one-sixth of the normal wage. The companies have designed various schemes to conceal this and have prevented the trainees from contacting the outer world. In extreme cases the employers confined the trainees within company grounds. Such trainees have been unable to obtain necessary information or express their opinions. Japanese volunteers have had difficult making contact with trainees confined in this way.”

12. “From April 1991 to March 1992, the Osaka Regional Immigration Bureau granted 90 percent of the 3,000 trainee applications received. however, according to the officials of the bureau, the suspect that roughly two-thirds of these 3,000 entered Japan with the intent to work. Yet with only three officials in charge of trainees, it is difficult to investigate their real conditions.”

13. Author gives example of 27 Filipinos who came to Japan as trainees. Worked twelve hours per day as key punchers with no holidays. The were paid ¥63,000 per month. They managed to fight their employers and get overtime pay. However, labor brokers in Philippines threatened them and said they’d keep them from ever being employed in the Philippines. (Where they had to return to as they could not obtain trainee status anymore.)

14. Author mentions a new system called trainee-in-practice, in which first six months are to be training including language teaching. After this the trainee is eligible to work for a year and half. At the time of the essay, there was not much information regarding the success of this program.

15. However, in regards to the trainee-in-practice system, the author gives a short case study in how bad things can go under such a program. The case study involves 11 Philippine nurses, who were ordered to do menial chores and illegal medical practices. They were threatened with monetary punishment if they did not pass certain certification programs. This was despite that they had passed Philippine certifications programs that were more difficult.

16. “As mentioned above, many trainees were forced to work without wages for over ten or twelve hours a day but they were not protected by the labor laws. Trainees should not be treated as alternatives to foreign workers to resolve the labor shortage. Formally, of course, the government position is the same. Trainees should be accepted only when the trainee would benefit from learning specific industrial skills and techniques in Japan. When a Japanese citizen is employed, he receives on-the-job-training, over the course of which he is paid wages and is protected by the labor laws. Why should a foreign trainee be treated any differently?”

17. “In January 1992, A Prime Ministers’s Office survey recommended that trainees conditions be improved [source cited]. After April 1993, the trainee-in-practice system was introduced and the Immigration Office was supposed to become strict in dispensing trainee visas. The trainee-in-practice system was to eventually replace the trainee system. Even in the trainee-in-practice system, trainees are not considered as workers and are discriminated against in treatment. Neither trainees nor trainees-in-practice should be treated as alternatives to unskilled foreign workers. The Labor Ministry should supervise both of them.”

Jan. 3, 2007

Article title and Link:
Foreign permanent residents on rise, filling gaps

Points article makes:

1. Article quote: “Japan’s population started declining in 2005, but in contrast, registered foreigners soared to a record high 2.01 million, a leap from 1.36 million a decade ago and accounting for 1.57 percent of the nation’s total population.”

2. Getting more foreigners into the work place is a hot topic.

3. Chinese represent the largest segment of foreigners receiving permanent residency.

4. Article quote: “Koreans still comprise the largest ethnic minority in terms of special permanent residency. In 2005, this group, including those in Japan before the war and their descendants, numbered some 598,000. Statistically, however, their numbers are declining yearly as the elderly pass away and younger Koreans opt to become Japanese citizens.”

5. Chinese account for 25 percent of all registered aliens. There are 519,000 registered Chinese in Japan.

6. Article quote: “In 2005, some [Chinese] 89,000 were registered as exchange students, 14,700 as engineers and 40,500 as trainees, while 2,500 came as university professors and 1,380 as investors.”

7. Article quote: “The most notable demographic trend, though, is the rise in permanent residents. This status is generally conferred on foreigners who have “contributed to Japan” for at least five to 10 years. While the number is up for most nationalities, Chinese top the list again. More than 106,000 registered as permanent residents last year, nearly twice the figure of five years ago.”