Recently the topic of foreign trainees came up for discussion on the Community in Japan list. I’ve blogged a lot on this topic previously.

Let me give a very opionated response to the recent news surrounding the trainee program.

Before I begin I should remind people why the trainee system is tragically flawed. Let’s not mince words. Basically it is not a trainee system, but a method used by small and mid-sized companies to procure cheap labor. These trainees face common abuses such as having their passports taken and their wages withheld. Even when they are paid, their salary is nearly always far below normal standards. Trainees work around the clock for little pay in horrible conditions, and often aren’t even protected by labor laws. Stories of abuses ranging from rape to isolation to not allowing people to practice their religion have constantly made the headlines. It’s all too obvious that the program has no competent oversight such that it’s nearly an anything goes world for those participating. Brokers in third world countries offer for exorbitant fees to get people into the program, but when they get to Japan they certainly must feel cheated. Many escape their job and become illegal laborers at different companies. The program is a disaster.

While the program actually does have some companies that really use it properly, these are sadly becoming the minority. As the population declines and the economy improves the problem looks surely set to spiral out of control. Action was needed literally years ago, but to date nothing has been done to really fix the problem.

Now recently three ministries have stepped forward with a plan to save the day. These would be:

The Ministry of Justice
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

There would seem to be the three views, roughly something like this …

Justice Ministry: Let’s stop pretending this is a trainee program and just admit openly that it’s a guest worker program. Then let’s be very clear that we expect labor laws to apply to the guest workers just like anyone else. We’ll crack down on the abuses. However, let’s be very clear that after the guests have stayed for three years, they MUST leave and they certainly can NOT come back. We don’t want these poor low life scum ruining Japanese society and culture.

Labor Ministry: Let’s just reform the system a bit. Let’s throw out the Industrial Training Program and instead focus on the Technical Internship Program. And you know that clause we’ve got about labor law not applying for the first year, well, let’s go ahead and apply it. That should fix things up, well, you know, maybe a little. I mean, this whole system is pretty lucrative for us bureaucrats, so let’s not rock the boat too much.

Economics Ministry: Let’s not let go of the idea that Japan is trying to help other countries by training their people. So what if the program becomes near slave labor at times. Even if it’s not true that were helping other countries, it’s the thought that counts. Do you know how much trouble it’ll be for us MITI bureaucrats to deal with these other countries if we were OPENLY using and throwing away their workers? They would hate us. We can’t lose the important facade that we’re helping to develop poor countries. Why don’t we offer a certification program for those who want to abuse the trainees. It won’t mean dirt, but it’ll give us bureaucrats a bit more power and that’s not bad, right?

Sorry if all this sounds a bit overboard. But then again maybe it’s not.

Let’s give some more background.

Most of the trainees now go through JITCO a bloated bureaucracy in and of itself. One that earns quite a bit of money. As Terrie Lloyd has noted:

As another article in the Daily Yomiuri reports, JITCO appears to be part of the problem, with the body being responsible for a reported 60% of all trainee visas. JITCO apparently earns JPY308m for visa application services and JPY1.148bn from member company dues, more than triple the amount 10 years ago. I wonder how JITCO is using this profit?

The JITCO is basically a partnership of five different bloated bureaucracies (ministries) and I’m sure in some way or another all of them have their hands in the cookie jar. Can you imagine any organization that can’t be changed unless five bloated bureaucracies can all agree to change it? All the while spiraling out of control for years?

What is lacking is someone in the non-permanent government, an elected official, who is willing to step forward and provide some leadership.

However, I’m not aware of any such politician. Is there anyone out there? As trainees can’t vote, I’d guess there isn’t anyone. For the record I searched both the LDP’s and the DPJ’s official sites and could not find anything worth commenting on in regards to the trainee program problem. The LDP grudgingly acknowledge the problem, but don’t seriously offer any solutions.

Now, if you look at the above proposals that each ministry has offered, they are all seriously flawed. None of them are ready to accept foreign laborers on anything but a temporary basis. This is either racism or at best culturism.

The idea that any of these bureaucrats want to provide legal protection for these workers is basically rhetoric. Consider this. If you worked in a job for three years, then for no explicit reason whatsoever you were fired and another person was hired to take your place (probably at a lower wage), wouldn’t you have rights? Of course you would. To a large extent labor laws in Japan protect citizens from such problems. So then why is it okay to do this to foreign laborers? It isn’t. It’s not fair. No matter what anyone says, until this is resolved, labor law is NOT in fact applying to foreigners.

I do think of all the proposals offered that the Justice Ministry’s proposal is the best, merely because it is the most honest and direct of all the proposals. It doesn’t attempt to pretend to be anything it is not. The author of the proposal should be commended for his directness and honesty.

Let us hope it is that policy that is chosen, and chosen soon. Then who knows, through such honesty, perhaps things can gradually improve.

News Links:

• 2007/05/28 Slain farm association official took fees from both Chinese trainees, farmers, Asahi Shimbun (via debito.org blog); “A slain former executive of a farm association had forced Chinese trainees to pay sizable fees that had already been covered by the farmers who accepted the trainees, sources said.”
• 2007/05/28 CRACK IN THE DOOR Cautiously, an Aging Japan Warms to Foreign Workers, Yuka Hayashi and Sebastian Moffett, Wall Street Journal; “Japan, long known for its resistance to mass immigration, is gradually starting to use more foreigners — known as gaikokujin roudousha in Japanese — to solve its labor shortage. They are taking up jobs in rural areas where industries such as agriculture and textiles are struggling. Big companies are filling their factories with foreigners to assemble auto parts and flat-panel TVs. In cities, foreign workers serve meals at restaurants and stock shelves at grocery stores. The 2005 census found Japan had 770,000 foreign workers, or 1.3% of its working population, up from 604,000 and 0.9% a decade earlier. That is still a far cry from the U.S., which has 22 million foreign-born workers, or 15% of the labor force. Nonetheless, for Japan it’s a big change.”
• 2007/05/19 Govt split over foreign trainee program, Takeshi Kosaka, Masaharu Nomura and Soichiro Kuboniwa, Yomiuri Shimbun; Excellent article. Well worth reading.
• 2007/05/18 Asahi: Update on NJ Trainee Worker program: reform or abolition?, debito.org blog; Article plus Debito’s comments.
• 2007/05/17 Nagase enters foreign-worker feud, The Asahi Shimbun; Discusses all the important topics, but not as good as the Yomiuri’s take above.
• 2007/05/16 Revised program for foreign trainees proposed, The Japan Times; “In an effort to curb misuse of the government-sponsored industrial training and internship program for foreign workers, Justice Minister Jinen Nagase proposed Tuesday allowing foreigners at authorized organizations to work for up to three years.”
• 2007/05/12 Panel: End exploitation of overseas trainees, The Yomiuri Shimbun; “A study group of the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry drew up an interim report Friday that calls for a revision of the training system for foreign workers, which is believed to have allowed cheap labor, to make it mandatory to pay salaries that are due to such workers.”
• 2007/05/12 Workplace training program to be axed, The Asahi Shimbun; “The labor ministry is set to abolish a first-year program for foreign nationals who come to Japan to learn work skills as trainees because many companies routinely exploit such workers, sources said.” I don’t think this is correct. I think three ministries are arguing over what to do.

Policy Links:

• SAKANAKA CHANNEL: 外国人技能実習制度改革論
• LIberal Democratic Party: 外国人労働者に関する方針について
• The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: 「研修・技能実習制度研究会中間報告」のとりまとめについて
• Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry: 外国人研修・技能実習制度に関する研究会とりまとめ報告
• The Ministry of Justice: [PDF] 「外国人労働者受入れに関する検討の指示について」
• Keidanran: 「外国人材受入問題に関する部会」が第１回会合

I want to present some data on the trainee system in Japan. Most information here pertains to both the Industrial Trainee Program and the Technical Internship Program.

The source of this information is cited at the end of this blog entry.

Particular attention here will be applied to JITCO (Japan International Training Cooperation Organization) trainees.

First, let’s look at a graph which shows the number of foreign trainees in Japan:

This basically corresponds to these numbers

year National JITCO other
1991 10,509 160 32,980
1992 11,298 8,067 24,262
1993 13,474 13,440 12,881
1994 14,813 12,879 8,920
1995 13,176 18,264 9,151
1996 12,593 23,078 9,865
1997 13,222 28,011 8,361
1998 14,136 26,075 9,586
1999 13,189 25,631 9,165
2000 13,030 31,898 9,121
2001 12,626 37,423 9,015
2002 12,351 39,724 6,459
2003 13,473 43,457 7,887
2004 13,817 51,012 10,530

It should be obvious here that most growth has taken place in trainees recruited through the assistance of JITCO. (”National” represents trainees brought to Japan with some form of direct involvement from the government.)

What is JITCO?

JITCO came into existence in 1991. Describing its technical functions is a bit complicated, but simply put it assists companies and groups of companies that seek trainees. JITCO was formed from a partnership of sorts between five ministries:

Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport

Many of those running the JITCO derived their position through amakudari from the various ministries listed above. At least one person has pointed out how profitable JITCO is and asked where all the profit JITCO makes goes (see here). Certainly considering how much money JITCO is actually receiving, such a question seems warranted. It is, after all, a very profitable venture.

Now let’s have a closer look at the JITCO trainees. Let’s look at the next graph:

If one looks at this chart, listed are two somewhat distinct entities that take in trainees. These are dantai (団体）and kigyou (企業). What should be clear here is that the number of trainees going to dantai has increased considerably, while the number of trainees going to kigyou has not.

Here are the raw numbers:

year dantai kigyou
1992 2,537 5,530
1993 4,300 7,778
1994 4,436 7,676
1995 5,941 10,796
1996 9,895 13,183
1997 15,172 12,839
1998 14,867 11,208
1999 16,480 9,151
2000 22,875 9,023
2001 27,470 9,953
2002 30,903 8,821
2003 34,851 8,606
2004 43,118 7,894

So what are dantai and kigyou?

Kigyou basically means company. So the numbers in the far right column are basically trainees going to companies.

Dantai basically means group. And what you have here in many cases are very small companies that find it difficult to procure and provide for trainees on their own directly (even with JITCO assistance). So they form various organizations together with other small companies such that they can procure and provide for trainees.

It’s important to note that before 1990 this was not possible. Previously, for the most part, only multinational corporations, presumably with overseas branches, were able to procure trainees. There were specific requirements that were weakened in 1990 as far as immigration law that made it possible for smaller companies to pool their resources together in order to get trainees. Moreover, despite negative consequences of this weakening of immigration law, the law was further weakened in 1993.

If there were negative consequences, then why was the law further weakened? Because while the trainee program masks itself in the tatemae of being a program designed to help underdeveloped countries, the honne or reality is that it is a guest worker program whose purpose is to help Japan not underdeveloped countries.

Multinational corporations with overseas branches have a genuine need to allow foreigner nationals to come over to Japan. But how about small clothing factories with barely 19 workers? Or how about small time food makers? Even though these companies don’t have any presence overseas, by merely being Japanese they supposedly operate using advanced procedures that would be useful for trainees to learn. Even if one buys this implausible explanation, one is forced to ask, just why do such small companies want to share their “advanced” techniques with overseas nationals from underdeveloped countries? Out of the goodness of their hearts? Clearly there must be profit in it.

If one reviews the literature and the media discussion revolving around the idea of a guest worker program in the late 1980’s, then it becomes very clear that the loosening of the immigration law in 1990 to allow more trainees was clearly to help solve potential labor shortages in Japan. The government did not want a guest worker program despite many cries from the business sector for such a program. Instead, the government loosened immigration law in regards to trainees.

Let’s look at some more statistics. First another graph. This graph will show the size of the various companies that trainees get sent to. Size is gauged by looking at the number of workers at each company

Here are the raw numbers:

# of workers at company / # of JITCO trainees / cumulative % of all trainees

1 to 19 / 19,523 / 38.3
20 to 49 / 6,314 / 50.7%
50 to 99 / 7,167 / 64.7%
100 to 199 / 838 / 76.1%
200 to 299 / 2,814 / 81.6%
300 to 999 / 4,406 / 90.2%
over 1000 / 4950 / 100%

It should be clear here that most JITCO trainees are going to fairly small companies. Most of these companies do not have the facilities to train trainees, but instead procures trainees as a form of inexpensive unskilled labor.

Here is the industry breakdown showing where each JITCO trainees was going in 2004:

Here are the raw numbers for JITCO trainees in 2004:

Industry (Japanese in parenthesis)…………….number…..percentage
clothing (衣類 その他機械製品製造業)………..14078…….27.6%
foodstuff (食料品製造業)……………………………7426……..14.6%
transport (輸送用機械器具製造業)………………3561………7%
electrical machinery (電気機械器具製造業…..4003………7.8%
construction (建設関連工事業)……………………2722………5.3%
metal working (金属製品製造業)…………………2881 ……..5.6%
agriculture (農業)……………………………………..3444 ……..6.8%
plastics (プラスチック製品製造業)……………..2084……..4.1%
textiles (繊維工業 )…………………………………….1136……..2.2%
precision machinery (精密機械器具製造業) ….1023……..2%
general machinery (一般機械器具) …………….1368……..2.7%
other (その他)………………………………………..7286…….14.3%

In all these industries, we are talking about very small shops and factories, where a lot of manual labor is done. Clothing and foodstuff alone account for 42.2 percent of the total.

Another statistic worth looking at is monthly pay. Industrial trainees are not supposed to receive pay, even though the reality is that they are working in most cases as unskilled laborers. They can though receive a sort of allowance.

The following chart shows what the average allowance has been over the last several years:

Here are the raw figures for JITCO industrial trainees:

Year / dantai trainees / kigyou trainees
1997 ¥85,554 ¥105,200
1998 ¥83,324 ¥101,017
1999 ¥77,319 ¥102,154
2000 ¥71,685 ¥98,286
2001 ¥68,126 ¥94,090
2002 ¥66,437 ¥89,780
2003 ¥64,891 ¥89,780
2004 ¥64,024 ¥84,819

Note that those trainees going to companies through dantai with the assistance of JITCO are getting an average of ¥64,024 per month (in other words half are getting less than that!). That is a startlingly low salary to be paid in the world’s second largest economy. It is only made possible because the system pretends to be other than what it really is. The reality is, of course, that it is a guest worker program.

As far as technical trainees (as opposed to industrial trainees) they are allowed a salary, but even here over 97% make far below the average salary of a high school graduate in Japan. Moreover, the salary paid to technical trainees has been dramatically falling in recent years.

Most of this information is from the book following book:

外国人研修生：時給３００円の労働者
Gaikoku-jin Kenshuusei: Jikyuu 300-en no Roudousha
(Foreign Trainees: The 300 yen an hour laborers)

The book is edited by:
外国人研修生問題ネットワーク
Gaikoku-kenshuusei Mondai Nettowaaku
Foreigner Trainee Network

Pages 70 to 82 presents an informative essay by Kawakami Sonoko (川上園子) from which most of the information presented above comes.

Kawakami Sonoko’s information in turn came from the following source:
JITCO 白書
JITCO Hakusho
JITCO White Paper

Article:
Foreign trainees or slaves? (Nov 13, 2006)

Source:
Japan Today

Author:
Terrie Lloyd

Notes from article:

1. A Yomiuri article noted in November that a company in Akitakata was padding its employee numbers so that they could hire more foreign trainees. The foreign trainees were 50% cheaper than regular employees.

2. Lloyd argues this is the tip of the ice berg and that using the system for unskilled labor is now common place.

3. “The trainees work/train under near-slavery conditions and the fall-out from this seems to be increasing. Last year alone, 1,888 of them ran away from their postings, many going on to become illegal workers elsewhere in the country. Broken down by nationality, they numbered 3,516 Chinese, 2,629 Vietnamese, and 1,498 Indonesians — pretty much the same ratios as the nationalities being brought in under the program.”

Comment: I don’t understand the relationship between the 1,888 number and the numbers that follow.

4. There are 83,000 trainees who come to Japan each year. Seventy percent are from China. They work in 62 different types of industries.

Comment: There was a new trainee program from 1993, do these numbers include the new program. The new program has much less members, but under the 1993 program participants can work after their training period.

5. The number of trainees in agriculture are about 9000 compared with 2,200 Japanese high school graduates.

Comment: Well there is a 1 trainee per 20 worker rule, so I’m not sure if I understand these numbers.

6. “The trainee system has been turned into a form of legalized “slavery.” Most trainees for the duration of their three years have virtually no employment rights (they are, after all supposed to be trainees not employees) and are paid unbelievably low compensation — just 66,000 yen (average) a month plus accomodation in the first year, and a more luxurious 118,000 yen (average) or so for the following two years. Could you survive on this?”

Comment: This is unclear. The trainee system is not for three years, unless this is in reference to the Practical Trainee program created in 1993. However, under the practical trainee program workers *have* rights. Whether they can actually exercise them is another matter. But once they become workers, they are covered under labor law. Moreover, *most* trainees don’t stay three years, because under the pre-1993 program it’s not allowed.

7. Lloyd sites some sites three examples of flagrant abuse of the program.

8. “According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, companies accepting foreign trainees and workers are mostly small-scale businesses with less than 19 employees. There were more than 180 documented cases of fraud or mistreatment last year and it is suspected that a lot more cases go unreported. In fact a Ministry of Health survey found that of 731 reviewed companies, a full 80% of them were violating the minimum wage law and labor standards law for their 2nd- and 3rd-year trainees.”

Comment: The violations of minimum wage are serious, but this would apply to participants of the 1993 program, whose numbers are significantly less than the pre-1993 program.

9. “Obviously the problem is severe enough that the ministry is allocating 400 million yen to its quango looking after the placement of trainees, JITCO, for the purpose of monitoring participating companies to make sure that they stay compliant with the trainee program rules.”

10. Lloyd expresses the opinion that a better system would be one that really trains for one year, and then allows workers to stay on indefinitely. I agree.

Final comment: This is an interesting article, but the statistics given, while important, aren’t given in a clear manner, and specific sources are not given.

More notes:

Terrie Lloyd the author of the article also has a two part series dealing with this issue on at www.daijob.com.

Notes for part one:

1. Mostly similar to editorial.

Notes for part two:

1. Gives the story of a Chinese trainee on a pig farm who after complaining of harsh work conditions was told he’d be deported. He attacked his “trainers” with a knife. This attracted attention to the issue.

2. “According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, companies accepting foreign trainees and workers are mostly small-scale businesses with less than 19 employees. There were more than 180 documented cases of fraud or mistreatment last year (2005) and it is suspected that a lot more cases go unreported. In fact a Ministry of Health survey found that of 731 reviewed companies, a full 80% of them were violating the minimum wage law and labor standards law for their 2nd-and 3rd-year trainees. Obviously the problem is severe enough that the Ministry is allocating JPY400m (US$3.38m) to the organization tasked with looking after the placement of trainees, JITCO. The money is for increased monitoring of participating companies to make sure that they stay compliant with the trainee program rules.”

3. Article notes that JITCO is making money off the program.

Reading notes for “Migration, globalization and the nation state, Japan” by Yoko Sellek, from The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization edited Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook, published by Routledge, 2001.

1. Article begins: “In an increasingly globalized world, international migration has to be seen as a complement to other flows and exchanges taking place between countries. During the last two decades or so, the issue of migration has emerged as one of the most serious crises in industrialized nations. The main reason for this is that, in an era of growing economic globalization, when each state is moving towards border-free economic spaces in the world order, the flow of migrants is largely determined by a global labour market, being more or less impervious to governmental policies. It is ultimately impossible to intensify border controls to keep migrants out, so any attempts by government to restrict the entry of migrants result in the growth of an illegal foreign migrant population. The existence of illegal migrants itself demonstrates an erosion of the state’s sovereignty.”

2. Foreign migrants often stay in their new country even after the employment opportunities they sought no longer exist. They form new groups within the country that have significant impacts.

3. Japan is traditionally regarded as having a strict citizen acquisition process, and one that does not encourage immigration. “Although the number of foreign residents with alien registration permits in Japan has continued to increase, the country has the lowest proportion of foreigners of any major industrialized country, with just 1.51 million in 1998, representing only 1.20 per cent of the then total Japanese population of more than 126 million (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau 1999b: 19).”

4. Article notes the phenomena of special residents, in particular Koreans, who born in Japan have grown up there and are socially Japanese, but do not possess citizenship. This is because of Japan’s racially exclusive policies.

5. “Employment opportunities for foreigners in Japan are strictly controlled.” Only skilled workers are allowed in. Despite this there is a growing number of unskilled workers, many not legal.

6. Quote: “This chapter addresses globalization in the migration arena using the case of contemporary Japan. Japan has participated in constructing a global economic system and has grown vastly richer partly as a result of the liberalization of capital flows and trade in goods and services. In parallel with these flows of capital and goods, however, an influx of foreign workers has emerged.”

7. While countries in Western Europe relied on foreign labor to help boost their economies in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan during the same time period used other methods to help boost production. However, since the 1980s as Japan has become increasing part of the global economy with links to many other nations, it has become a major destination for migrants.

8. Factors influencing demand for foreign unskilled labor in Japan include low birth rate, undesirability of 3D work (dirty, dangerous, and dull), both of which lead to a shortage of workers.

9. “These statistics indicate that, although there is no category that accommodates ‘unskilled workers’ in the Immigration Control Act, the reality has become such that a strong polarization exists, on the one hand, between a firm government policy dictating that only small numbers of skilled foreign labourers are to be admitted, and the presence of half a million unskilled foreign workers from Asia and South America, including nearly 270,000 illegal workers according to figures published in July 1999, on the other.”

10. There are two types of demand for workers in Japan. There are those who will bring in expertise that is not readily present in Japan, in particular, those who have skills related to the managing global businesses are wanted. On the other hand in the area of small and medium sized industrial businesses, there is an acute shortage of labor as Japanese no longer want this type of work.

11. There is also a demand for foreigners in education and local government as Japan tries to “internationalize” itself. Also, in rural areas, farmers seek Asian brides.

12. National government officials have tried to maintain their ideals of a ethnically homogenous and harmonious society, with the stark reality of a strong demand for unskilled cheap labor and a near limitless supply.

13. The government tried to resolve the dilemma above by revising immigration laws with the revise Immigration Control Act in June 1990. The idea was to be more strict towards the presence of illegal immigrants, while on the other hand creating side-door methods in which cheap unskilled labor can be brought into Japan, quasi-legally.

14. One main source of legal unskilled labor has been the Nikkeijin. Third-generation “Japanese” living in Latin America can obtain the necessary visas to work in Japan under any occupation. It was hoped that being ethnic Japanese they would be able to acclimatize better to Japan.

15. “As evidenced by the revised Immigration Control Act, the government is proactive towards the expansion of the acceptance of skilled transients in order to improve the country’s position in a globalizing economy, while it is reactive against the influx of illegal foreign workers which has, in a sense, emerged in accordance with the development of new global economic processes.”

16. Quote: “The system of foreign ‘trainees’, the official purpose of which is ‘to contribute to the industrial, social, and economic development of various developing countries through an attempt to transfer technology, technical skills, expertise and/or knowledge which have been accumulated in Japan’ (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau 1996a: 8 ), has been used as a very convenient mechanism for ensuring a constant labour supply through OJT (On-the-Job Training).”

17. The trainee system was first implemented in the 1960s. Companies overseas wanted to send local workers to Japan for training.

18. Quote: “Responding to this long-term pressure, in 1981 the Ministry of Justice introduced the status of residence 4-1-6 (Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 6) which was originally established to accept foreign students (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau 1999d: 3). In April 1993 the Ministry of Justice implemented the Technical Intern Training Programme, which permits trainees to engage in employment, including manual labour, for a certain period after the completion of their actual training. Compared with the original trainee scheme, the new Technical Intern Training Programme gives trainees many more rights as ‘workers’ and, in 1997, the ministry further extended the programme by extending the retention period for trainees from the original two years to three years. 2 Furthermore, according to the basic principle of immigration policy in 2000, the ministry is prepared to extend the programme even further by increasing the range and types of skill covered by the programme. It will include caring for elderly people as a part of the measures against the country’s demographic trends, which include reduced fertility rates and rapid population ageing (Asahi Shinbun 14 January 2000).”

19. Quote: “Both the original trainee system and the Technical Intern Training Programme not only provide a mechanism for the legal supply of ‘unskilled labour’ to companies suffering from shortages of labour, but also contribute to an external perception of Japan as a leader in Asia through the system’s stated objectives of human capital development and technology transfer. Also, the expectation is that the system of foreign trainees will not generate many of the social problems that have plagued Western countries that have received foreign workers in the past, since they would normally come to Japan for only a limited period of time without bringing their families.”

20. Another side-door mechanism detailed is through “pre-college” students who are allowed to work up to four hours a day legally. Many of them actually work much more. Laws were adjusted to help curtail this in 1993. This had an impact on many of the Chinese who had been taking advantage of this loop-hole. However, giving that student enrollment is declining in Japan, in order to help support the university system, the government again revised these laws in 1997, relaxing the requirement that students must have guarantors. Most who work under a student visa do so in the service industry.

21. Quote: “The main concern of the government, in particular during the recession, has been to prevent Japan from following the experience of Western Europe after the oil crisis of 1973. What the government is anxious about is that, just as in the West European experience, the first phase of labour migration might merge into a second phase of family reunification, and these migrations might then result in demands for increased expenditure on housing, schooling, and medical and social facilities. On the surface, this concern in relation to immigration control may appear to be economic. It is, however, more than that. As in other countries, the core of immigration control in Japan is political and is closely associated with the nature of the sovereign state. Underlying the nature of the sovereign state is a doctrine of social, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. As these various elements of homogeneity break down, the policy-making elite needs to take counter-measures in order to maintain the fundamental characteristics of the state. The fear is of losing control of the population which, in turn, will undermine the elite’s power. In the case of Japan, which sees itself as closed and ethnically homogeneous, fear of the emergence of various groups of foreigners who could dilute this homogeneity is obviously significant.”

22. The author notes that while the prolonged recession decreased the number of illegal immigrants, that most illegal immigrants are now staying on much longer. “In 1998, those who had stayed in Japan longer than five years comprised 25.7 per cent of the total number of apprehended illegal foreign workers ( Japan Immigration Association 1999a: 58).”

23. The author notes that regarding Nikkeijin, that while the original wave that came in during the bubble era were those who could speak some Japanese, a second wave of immigrants has now emerged, and they often do not speak Japanese nor have any familiarity with its customs. Also, now more people are coming with their entire families.

24. Also, as far as Nikkeijin are concerned, utilizing cable and satellite television they can watch their home programs. Stores catering to their special needs have sprung up. Communication prices have greatly diminished, and there is much less emotional distance than there previous was. Communities in Aichi, Shizuoka and Gunma have taken root.

25. The number of registered foreigners has continued to increase despite the prolonged recession.

26. Quote: “Initially, the Japanese government put most of its effort in the field of immigration control into controlling the national border, being mainly concerned with short-term economic gain through the fulfilment of labour requirements. However, these foreigners often reside in Japan much longer than the government had initially expected, which conflicts with the country’s traditional immigration policy, i.e. that all foreigners should be admitted on a temporary basis only. As these foreigners are beginning to be accepted as ordinary, rather than exceptional, foreigners, their economically driven migration has eventually spilled over into the social, cultural and political domains of Japanese society and some of the components of sovereign power over immigration control in Japan have been influenced and reshaped by their existence. Problems arising from having a large number of foreign residents in Japanese society tend to rise to the surface where the existing social system has not yet accommodated the requirements of such non-Japanese. They include, for example, various social services such as education for foreign children and health insurance. The main dilemma for the government is that, although it possesses exclusive authority to define its nationals as well as to control the entry of non-nationals like any sovereign state, because non-nationals reside in Japan for long periods of time and eventually create precedents as ‘residents’, the government inevitably becomes more and more accountable to all its residents, regardless of their nationalities, as increasing focus comes to be placed on their human rights. Issues related to medical care and health insurance schemes for foreign residents illustrate this dilemma.”

27. Author spends a considerable amount of space discussing National Health Insurance programme. The system in anachronistic and ill suited for the new immigrants needs. Very good analysis here.

28. Quote: “Although Japan may still wish to see itself as closed and ethnically homogeneous, Japanese society today paints a different picture, pointing towards the emergence of a society in which multiple cultures and affiliations going beyond the nation state are being syncretized in a complex way. For the Japanese, the existence of foreign workers as ‘residents’ may be seen as the internal globalization of society and the identity of the Japanese people. Traditionally, the Japanese people have been territorializing their identity on the basis of myths of ethnic purity and of cultural homogeneity. The current situation in which transnational identities have been increasingly proliferating will certainly represent a threat for the Japanese people and will eventually erode their national identity or may create countervailing tendencies such as racism.”

members has come in during the prolonged recession. Also, those who now come to Japan with their entire family has also increased.

Article:
Migration News Vol. 14 No. 1: Japan, Korea

Source:
Migration News

1.

Foreign trainees work in Japan for one year; they can remain two more years as advanced trainees at higher wages. Trainees often work long hours for below-minimum wages, earning about $15,000 a year while the minimum wage yields $28,000 a year.

A Justice Ministry investigation reported that 9,500 foreign trainees had absconded between 2000 and 2006. Some abscond because they can earn more as unauthorized workers, especially since many Japanese firms do not pay even the lower-than-minimum wages due trainees. A 2005 survey found that 80 percent of the 730 firms with foreign trainees were violating the Labor Standards Law and the Minimum Wages Law.

Some 83,319 foreign trainees were admitted to Japan in 2005, including 55,150 from China. Most are employed in small manufacturing companies and farms, and they are supposed to receive training to compensate for their low wages. However, many are required to work long hours, and if they complain their employers threaten to fire them, which leads to their removal from Japan. Reformers want to convert trainees to guest workers who would be subject to labor laws, and reform the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization, which administers the trainee program, to increase monitoring of trainee conditions.

Comment: Great statistics. As I read this, the information is coming directly from the Ministry of Justice.

2.

The OECD’s July 2006 survey of Japan included a section on migrant workers (pp189-192), noting that postwar Japan has not been a country of significant immigration or emigration. In 2002, the 180,000 legal foreign workers in Japan, a third entertainers, were 0.3 percent of the labor force, and adding in descendants of Japanese emigrants (234,000), foreign students who work part time (83,000) and trainees (46,000), and unauthorized migrants (221,000), brings the total to 760,000, or 1.1 percent of the labor force. The OECD urged Japan to increase female labor force participation by changing tax laws, reducing discrimination and increasing childcare facilities.

Comment: Useful statistics. The OECD might want to urge Japan to increase female labor, but as I understand it the percentage of females already working is quite high. Moreover, if people want to increase the fertility rate, encouraging more females to work may not help. I’m not sure. Ultimately, I don’t like it when the government meddles into the personal lives of people in such a manner as to encourage or discourage them to have children.

Notes on Reluctant Hosts: The Future of Japan as a Country of Immigration by Takeyuki Tsuda (pdf).

[The link to the article now turns up a blank page. Not sure if this is a temporary problem or somethign permanent. For now use this link.]

As this paper is on-line, I’m only going to give very brief notes. This is an excellent paper and I would encourage people interested in this issue to read it entirely and carefully.

1. During Japan’s rapid economic expansion, Japan seemed to get by without the use of immigrants. However, as the author puts it: “By the mid-1980s, however, Japan lost its unique status among First World countries and finally succumbed to the pressures of global migration, demonstrating that no advanced industrialized country can sustain high levels of economic growth forever without becoming dependent on large populations of immigrant workers.”

2. There were about 800,000 unskilled workers in Japan in the mid-90s and many problems emerged.

3. At around the same time Japan was becoming a popular destination for migrants, the country went into a prolonged recession. As this seemed to solve to problem albeit temporarily, interest in the issue seemed to die down somewhat. However, the dynamics that existed then still exist, and the problem has far from gone away.

4. Tsudua reviews standard reasons why Japan will need immigrants. Population declining, unwillingness of young to do the 3D work (dirty, dangerous, dull.). Also the large pool of labor just next door in poorer Asian countries. Several other reason are explored.

5. Quote: “The Structural Embeddedness of Immigrant Labor in the Japanese Economy Two important, long-term changes in the Japanese domestic economy have made Japan a country of immigration: an acute unskilled labor shortage and an increasing need for a casual and flexible labor force.”

6. Tsuda notes that the changes in the Japanese economy he discusses are long-term structural ones not likely to reverse themselves. So the need for immigrants and their inevitable presence is not something that will go away.

7. “In 1989, 46 percent of companies in the manufacturing sector were labor-deficient, and the proportion increased to 58 percent in 1990 (Ministry of Labor Secretariat 1990-1995). Many of these firms were therefore forced to employ foreign workers as the only realistic and cost-efficient source of labor power.”

8. Despite the need for foreign workers, the Japanese government refused to *openly* to admit and to allow in the presence of unskilled workers.

9. Tsuda notes that there are many side-doors through which unskilled labor enters Japan. He notes, Trainees, Students, Entertainers, and Nikkeijin as four main doors.

10. Tsuda argues that the trainee system is merely a facade for a guest worker program.

11. He takes each side-door one at a time and explains how it works.

12. Next Tsuda discusses illegal immigrant labor.

13. “When these different types of illegals are considered, the total number of illegal immigrants in Japan is probably in the 400,000 to 500,000 range.”

14. Tsuda notes that immigration does not really try to stop the illegal immigration but restricts itself to token efforts. A large portion of those caught are those who turn themselves in.

15. There is no cooperation between police and immigration officials. The police do not attempt to find and arrest illegal immigrants, though in theory they could easily do so.

16. Tsuda notes how the presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants leads to serious abuses. Also, these workers but poorly receives, if they receive at all, any social services.

17. “Because of the national government’s refusal to grant basic human rights to foreign workers, a type of “local citizenship” for immigrants is emerging (Pak 2000). However, it is an uneven, haphazard, and uncoordinated conferral of rights without firm governmental guarantees.”

18. Tsuda notes that policy making is not overly democratic, but basically formed by the bureaucracy and rubber stamped by politicians. He has particularly harsh words for the Justice Ministry.

19. Quote: “In fact, two of the most important immigration policies (the trainee program and the admission of the nikkeijin), which have supplied Japan with most of its unskilled immigrant workers, have simply been imposed as Ministry of Justice decrees without Diet scrutiny or ratification or even public notification.”

20. Quote: “Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice is one of the most conservative, closed-minded institutions in Japanese society that still operates with ideologies of ethnic homogeneity, cultural purity, and a nation-state based on jus sanguinis (the principle of blood and descent). ”

21. Tsuda makes many interesting predictions for how the inevitable presence of migrant workers will be handled. Well worth reading in its entirety. He suggests that unless Japanese policy makers wake and and put together a good policy, they will be overwhelmed by the problems uncontrolled migration will bring.

Notes from “Foreign Workers and Immigration Policy” by Hirowatari Seigo from The Political Economy of Japanese Society Vol. 2 edited by Banno Junji; Oxford University Press, 1998, pages 99 to

1. Quote: “The essence of ‘training’ activities is ‘learning’ and in this sense it is the same as for ‘college student’ or ‘pre-college student’ residence statuses. ‘Training’ is ‘learning’ at institutions other than education institutions. ‘Work’ status is not included in ‘learning’ status. Accordingly, in cases in which a training allowance is paid to a trainee receiving practical training in a corporation, should the money provided exceed actual expenses (travel, living expenses, etc.) and amount to remuneration, the employer is open to the charge of facilitating illegal work and the trainee will be punished and/or deported for illegal work activity.” (Author cites two sources for this.)

2. Quote: “The point is that this sort of training system is not being taken at face value in the community. The distinction between practical training and work is very vague and the fact that corporations who were short-staffed utilized foreign workers in the guise of trainees was an openly acknowledged reality. In August 1989 the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau released data on the results of a survey conducted from April 1988. According to the data, of the 40 companies and 547 trainees surveyed, only 5 companies were judged overall by the Bureau to ‘have no particular problems’. In the remaining cases, there were suspicions that labour shortages were being overcome; 68 trainees were not permitted to renew their residence status and 13 were given deportation orders on the grounds that they were engaged in activities outside their status.”

[Comment: Clearly this information now is nearly 18 years old. But the question is, in the interim did the government ever do anything to improve the situation?]

3. At the time of the above reports, the government had at least some form of involvement in about 70% of the trainee programs. However, in 30% there was no involvement.

4. Note that from 1985 to 1990 the number of trainees more than doubled? Why? One guess is that during this time period of rapid economic expansion, the program was being used as a means to recruit unskilled labor.

5. After the above 1989 report deliberations occurred about how to revise the law. There was clearly a grey zone between what could constitute training and what could constitute unskilled labor. The Ministry of Justice said that this grey zone needed to be clarified before the program was expanded. The Ministry of Labour said very much the same thing.

6. Quote: “Kato Toshiyuki, who appeared before the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs as a trade union representative, introduced the concept that ‘training kills three birds with one stone’. His essential criticism of the training situation was that, whereas training worthy of the name should involve huge intake costs, the fact that corporations were supposedly ‘for the sake of global goodwill . . . proactively volunteering for training’ raised the question of whether or not it was in fact because ‘there was profit in it’. On the other hand, Masuda Masaichi, director of Nikkeiren ( Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations), emphasized in his testimony Japan’s need, as an advanced economy, to promote the intake of technical trainees for the purpose of economic assistance (i.e., technology transfer) to developing nations, as long as caution was exercised in the liberalization of human resources.”

7. Author cites a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in June 1990, that out of companies responding to the survey, 10% were taking in trainees. On average each company was taking in 16.8 trainees. Breakdown according to industry looked like this:
—Electrical machinery and appliances 20.2 %
—Finance and Insurance 19.1 %
—Manufacturing and Utilities 15.8%

8. Training period times were:
— 1 to 3 months 16.8%
— 3 to 6 months 25.2%
— 6 to 12 months 23.1%
—12 to 24 months 22.7%

Comment: Exactly how long should training take?

9. Costs per month
Less than 100,000 yen 17.7%
100,000 to 150,000 yen 16.5%
150,000 to 200,000 yen 30.8%
250,000 to 300,000 yen 13.9%

10. “There were, however, many complaints on the part of small and medium size enterprises, which have the most severe labour shortages, about securing trainees. If we accept as a premiss the reasonable argument that ‘training should actually cost money’, then it does not stand to reason that anybody would want trainees, but in reality this is not the case. The Ministry of Justice took a step that fitted with ‘reality’. The ’standards regarding training’ established by a ministerial ordinance of 1 June 1990 pursuant to clause 7, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 2 of the revised Immigration Law stipulated certain requirements regarding the institutions able to offer training, which included practical training, but where the institution was the state, a local municipal body, or in other ‘cases specified by notification of the Minister of Justice’, these standards were not to apply. The subsequent ‘Ministerial Notification Regarding Training’ of 9 August 1990 prescribed Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Commerce and Industry Associations, and small and medium size enterprise groups as exceptions to the standards, with the aim being ‘to expand ways for domestic small and medium size enterprises to be involved in training programmes’. The proviso, however, was that they were required to operate the training programmes with financial and other assistance from, and under the guidance of, national and/or local municipal bodies.”

Comment: If this analysis is correct, then clearly the trainee program is just a means by which small to medium sized businesses can obtain unskilled labor.

11. Statistics for trainees:
1985 … 13,987 ( China 2,877; South Korea 1,604; Thailand 1,233)
1986 … 14,388 ( China 2,848; South Korea 2,336; Indonesia 1,114)
1987 … 17,081 ( South Korea 2,800; China 2,688; Thailand 2,428)
1988 … 23,432 ( Thailand 4,708; China 3,840; South Korea; 3,343)
1989 … 29,489 ( Thailand 4,502; South Korea 4,125; Philippines 3,974)
1990 … 37,566 ( China 7,624; Thailand 5,075; South Korea 4,485)
1991 … 43,649 ( China 10,668; Thailand 6,290; South Korea 4,439)
1992 … 43,627 ( China 15,054; Thailand 5,385; South Korea 3,717)
1993 … 39,795 ( China 15,688; Thailand 4,075; Indonesia 3,433)

12. Quote: “The use of trainees entered a new phase in late June 1991 when it was reported that agreement about post-training work had been reached between the four ministries of Labour, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade and Industry. According to the report, ‘the agreement will allow trainees to switch to a “specified activities” residence status and work for about one year after one year’s training. The proviso is that this will be limited to trainees and corporations who undertake training under the guidance of the “foreigner training association” (a working title of an organization to be set up in October 1991)’. … This idea was promptly incorporated, as the ‘Technical Intern Training Programme’, into the December 1991 Second Report on Administrative Reform Focusing on the Lifestyle of the People and Responses to Internationalization of the Ad Hoc Administrative Reform Council.”

Comment: Why should a company want to have the worker continue working after they are trained? I can only read this as an enticement for those who properly train the workers in question. That is you train the worker, then you get to use them for a year or so as unskilled labor.

13. Quote: “The combined period of the training and the technical internship may not exceed two years. The matter of a new residence status being set up to cover the period of the internship is to be looked at, but for the moment this is to be covered by the residence status of ’special activities’. Interns’ families are not permitted to come to Japan during the period of the internship, and it is expected that, in order to guarantee that interns return to their home countries, certain steps will be taken to ensure that preparations for returning home are in place, such as supervision by the corporation through the provision of accommodation facilities, a departure reporting system, and regular payments into a travel expense account by the corporation. Moreover, the Japan International Training Co-operation Organization, which was established in October 1991, has been active in arranging the Technical Intern Training Programme.”

Comment: Note the care which is taken to insure that the trainee will not establish ties and want to stay in Japan. They cannot come to Japan with their families. That’s rather hard on married people, I would think, to be away from home for two years.

14. Author’s conclusions regarding Technical Intern Training Programme: “The above issues require further monitoring. The least that can be said is that, should the intake of foreign workers proceed on the condition of one year’s training in accordance with the above-mentioned programme, it will be viewed by future generations as having happened because of short-term labour market vested interests without the consensus of the people, particularly through an act of parliament after thorough debate, and without a clear response strategy for the social and human issues that arise from immigration. The intake quota will essentially be determined by the demand of the Japanese labour market (there will, of course, be political negotiations with participating countries). Here once again we will see the principle of ‘economic growth’ taking precedence on the pretext of fulfilling our international obligations ‘as a developed economy . . . for the sake of global friendship’.”

Notes from Challenges for Foreign Traineeship Programs in Japan by Yasushi Iguchi.

1. In the early 1990’s Japan was accepting about 40,000 trainees a year. About 25% of these trainees were funded by the government. The rest were private.

2. Out of the OECD countries, this means Japan had far more trainees than any other country. For example, the next highest number would be at about 20,000 for Germany. The UK and America have far less, ranging from 3000 to 5000 any given year. Why are there so many trainees in Japan?

3. Article notes that trainees cannot be accompanied by their families.

4. Article notes trainee programs first started in the 1960s when multinational corporations with headquarters in Japan, wanted to train local workers from other countries in Japan. This seems perfectly sensible to me.

5. Article notes four main reasons for trainees in multinational corporation case.
- i. basic education
- ii. teach knowledge on specific products and processes
- iii. encourage long term commitment
- iv. encourage a linkage between R&D in home country, and production in foreign country.

6. Quote: “September 1990 saw the deregulation of arrangements for traineeship programs in small and medium-size enterprises that do not have any affiliates or joint ventures overseas. It is now possible for them to accept foreign trainees through intermediary bodies such as chambers of commerce, local employers’ associations and certain legally recognized non-profit organizations. The number of trainees such firms can have is up to five percent of the number of regular employees the enterprise hires.”

7. For trainees of small or medium size firms, there is no guarantee of work upon returning home.

8. “Some foreign trainees might become “disguised” workers able to earn more than the training allowances currently paid in Japan. Some Japanese companies accept trainees simply to secure a workforce in occupations Japanese people are not willing to do (Japan Institute of Labour 1997a; Hanami and Kuwahara 1995; Kajita 1993; and Tezuka and Komai 1992).”

9. In the case of Chinese workers, China monitors the workers progress closely, and offers employment when they return.

10. “The cost of accepting foreign trainees through intermediary organizations is not insignificant. According to a study by the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), the initial cost of accepting a foreign trainee is ¥510,000. About 80 percent of this initial cost is to cover accommodations and expenses involved with sending their mission to Asia. The on-going cost of having a foreign trainee for one year is ¥1.79 million. That figure includes ¥1.08 million for the training allowance, about ¥70,000 for travel to Japan, ¥60,000 for utilities and ¥20,000 for off-the-job training. On the average, individual companies pay ¥1.27 million and the intermediary body pays ¥520,000 (JITCO 1997b).”

11. Here it notes that the Technical Intern Traineeship Program was explicitly to obtain foreign labor. “The introduction of the TITP was thus conceived as an alternative means of widening legal channels for accepting foreign workers while tightening the controls on illegal workers.”

Notes from The Politics of Foreign Labor Policy in Korea and Japan by Yong Wook Lee and Hyemee Pari. Published in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 35, 2005.

1. Sourth Korea (Korea) was traditionally a non-immigration country.

2. As Korea grew into a more developed economy, small and medium sized companies began to make more use of unskilled laborers from other countries. Rights abuses became widespread. In particular this was prevalent among illegal foreign workers.

3. Quote: “In this context, on July 31,2003, the National Assembly of Korea passed one of the fairly advanced pro-foreign workers legislation currently practiced in the world, the “Employment of Foreign Workers Act (EFWA),” which called for an introduction of a “work permit system.” This made Korea the third country in Asia, after Singapore and Taiwan, that adopted the EFWA, in which foreign workers are entitled to bonus allowance, retirement pay and the three basic labor rights of unionizing, collective bargaining and collective action.”

4. This is in stark contrast to Japan, in which discussion of the EFWA has never even been debated in the Diet.

5. Why was the bill successful in Korea, but not Japan?

6. Both Korea and Japan share many similarities. “Both countries have a tradition of the so-called “strong states” relatively independent from social pressures in determining policy outcomes. Self-understandings of nationhood of both countries have been historically ethno-cultural and differentialist as ethnically homogeneous countries, which are identified as important variables for state policies toward immigrants. In addition, both countries have identified social and cultural homogeneity embedded in their society as one of the elements that contributed to their postwar economic successes.”

7. The article contends that limited state action is the reason the EFWA has not been successful. “we attribute the success to the more extensive, organized pro-foreign workers coalition of state actors and human rights activists over the course of actions. When this observation is applied to Japan, the absence of an active role of the state accounts for Japan’s relative silence on the EFWA.”

8. Although the EFWA as accepted in Korea gives many rights to foreign workers, it still only allows them into the country for a limited time. It does not grant them permission to bring in their families. However, it goes soft on illegal workers, granting some amnesty and others very soft penalties. However, it tries to insure that workers will not stay for prolonged periods.

9. Since the second half of the 1980s, Japan and Korea became a significant destination for immigrants from many developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Both governments were under pressure to solve the numerous infringements on human rights that these migrations brought about. “At the center of this problem was the increasing number of illegal foreign workers. They are not permissible legally to do unskilled works but are economically significant because of their willingness to do the kinds of jobs that few Japanese or Koreans are interested in doing.” As they are not technically legal, they suffer from human rights violations. It is no longer just an issue of controlling immigration but solving the numerous problems that have come about by the already uncontrolled migrations.

10. Japan responded before Korea by passing a new set of immigrations procedures in 1989, that came into effect in 1990. These new procedures were defined in the revised Immigration Control Act. Supposedly this act gave rights to foreign workers, however, Japan still maintained a policy of attempting to keep out unskilled laborers which were desperately wanted by small and mid-sized businesses.

11. Quote: “However, in a situation where a demand for labor in Japan was great and a vast supply of labor in developing Asian countries existed, it was inevitable for unskilled foreign workers to come to Japan to find work. In order to curb employment of illegal foreign workers, the government made two channels available for de facto unskilled labor migration. One was the trainee system in the name of the Technical Internship Program; the other was the recruitment of Nikkeijin (descendants of Japanese emigrants), giving access to residential status with no restriction on employment. ”

[Here it is taken for granted that the Technical Internship Program was a means to allow unskilled labor into Japan.]

12. Japan revised the act again in 1997 and 1999, but still has not succeeded in stemming the tide of illegal immigrants.

13. Article notes that early on Korea’s policy towards immigrants was very similar, even as far as trainee programs went: “Based on the Japanese model of the “Industrial and Technical Training Program for Foreigners,” the Korean government introduced the “Industrial Technical Trainee Program (ITTP)” as a side door to bring in (unskilled) foreign workers.” By 2001, the program eventually had 100,000 participants. The program was problematic in that workers were not granted many rights that Koreans would have had. It also did not alleviate the need for unskilled laborers or help the illegal immigration problem. Not only this but the program unintentionally encouraged illegal immigration as trainees often stayed on as workers (often at different companies).

14. Illegals were treated poorly by employers, who threatened them with deportation if they complained.

15. A very long portion of the journal deals with the politics behind getting the EFWA passed in Korea. (At a later date I might try to make notes of some of this, because a lot of it might offer useful lessons for those who wish to create similar change in Japan.)

16. Quote: “Although it is difficult in this article to convey the full-blown comparison between Japan and Korea, one striking difference between the two countries is found in state actors’ responses to international migration flows. In contrast to Korea, Japanese state actors showed far less effort at pushing for rights and integration of foreign workers into Japanese society. Unlike its Korean counterpart, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Labor (one of the two principal authorities in charge of immigration along with the Ministry of Justice that has taken the hardest anti-immigration line) was fundamentally suspicious of the integration of unskilled foreign workers. Despite the fact that foreign workers (both skilled and unskilled) have already been deeply embedded in the Japanese economy, the Ministry of Labor has argued that “the admission of unskilled immigrant workers could lead to an avalanche of foreigners, who, in turn, would undermine Japan’s labor market and social cohesion.” As such, from the Ministry of Labor’s point of view, the integration of foreign workers in general and unskilled foreign workers in particular could not be seen either as a legitimate response or as a permanent solution to Japan’s labor shortages.”

17. Quote: “The role of Japanese state actors as a countervailing force is also observed in the differences between national and local governments’ responses to foreigners in Japan. While local governments tend to make steady efforts in constructing a policy of accommodation in response to the realities of Japan’s de facto emergence as a destination of international migration flows, Japan’s national government continues to be strongly anti-immigrant. It warns against Japan’s reliance on foreign workers for its labor shortages and encourages employers to offset labor shortages by improving efficiency and using labor-saving production techniques to the fullest.”

Comment: I have to review the article more closely, but I’m not convinced of their conclusions. After all who influences the state in these matters? I do think a lot of the background information presented in this article is useful though.

Reading notes for Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, published 1994 by Stanford University Press. (Note, there is a more recent edition of the book.) These notes cover pages 397 to 400 from Chapter 11, which covers Japan and is written by the editor of the book.

1. Quote: “Potentially more important in the future, especially as the pools of Latin American Nikkeijin are exhausted, is another of Japan’s currently operating backdoor immigration policies, the “company trainee” programs. In 1991, 43,649 foreigners were admitted to Japan as trainees of private companies; about the same number were admitted in 1992, mostly from mainland China, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia.”

2. Quote: “The Japanese government officially justifies the company trainee programs as a form of development assistance to poorer countries — a vehicle for skill and technology transfer. However, independent observers consider this to be diplomatic window dressing, since most of the skills acquired by company trainees are not directly transferable to jobs in their home countries unless the Japanese firms that provide the training have established subsidiaries or joint-venture plants there.”

3. It is estimated that once the Japanese economy recovers the program maybe increased to the extent that between 200,000 to 300,000 foreigners will be entering in Japan.

4. At the time of the chapter’s writing, over 500 different recruitment networks were being established between the Japanese government with the cooperation of Chinese local government councils. Similar agreements were being negotiated with Indonesia.

5. Even as the economy was in a downturn the program was expanded. Why? The author suggests the following: “The most plausible explanation is that the officials responsible for these programs, like the private employers who have come to rely upon foreign workers, are taking the long view of Japan’s labor supply situation. They do not see the domestically unmet demand for unskilled labor as being cyclical; rather, they consider it a structural feature of the Japanese economy in the last decade of the twentieth century and beyond. While the recent economic downturn may have taken some pressure off labor-short small and medium-sized businesses, these same firms remain deeply concerned about future supplies of young workers.”

6. Quote: “The company trainee approach to solving the country’s long-term labor shortage has won strong support from Japan’s business organizations, several of which have developed and presented to the government their own designs for foreign-worker training programs (see, for example, Japan Foodservice Association 1990; Tokyo Chamber of Commerce 1989).”

7. The author notes that the program was expanded in 1993. Under a new part of the program, known as the Practical Trainee program, foreigners could remain in Japan and work for up to a year and a half after receiving their training (supposedly on the job training.)

8. The Practical Trainee program “has intensified criticism of the company trainee programs, primarily by intellectuals, on the grounds that most jobs held by foreign trainees are exactly those that Japanese citizens will not do; that many employers provide very little actual training; and that most companies are simply using the trainees as a source of cheap, unskilled labor.”

9. foreign tranees during the first year are not treated as regular employees. This means they are not covered by Japanese labor law. They don’t recieve regular wages, health insurance, workmen’s compensation and other fringe benefits.

10. Quote: “Foreign trainees are, in fact, somewhat cheaper to the firm than the average Japanese employee. Employers pay no recruitment fees and have no long-term obligations to their foreign trainees. Only if the employer opts to retain a trainee for a second year and the foreign trainee passes a certifying examination given by the Ministry of Labor does he become an officially recognized employee with standard benefits and protections.”

11. Those who criticize the trainee system point out that most utilizing it are small and medium sized businesses who simply cannot offer the appropriate training, but are, in fact, in need of unskilled workers.

12. There is no enforcement mechanism in place to make sure the workers return home after their training. While some home countries, such as China, are make strong efforts to recover their workers, other countries are not.

13. Quote: “A greatly expanded company trainee system could be the functional equivalent of a quota system for immigration, but it would probably be more effective in maintaining the strict-rotation principle than a U.S., Canadian, or Spanish-style quota system. 41 The company trainee approach offers other advantages. It is attractive to employers (any Japanese company can participate if it agrees to abide by the government’s rules), is more acceptable to the Japanese public than a formal quota system, and avoids the diplomatic sensitivities of allocating visas among the sending countries that are Japan’s close neighbors. Some academic experts believe that the political difficulties raised by a formal quota system would paralyze the government bureaucracy. Therefore, expanding the company trainee program is both a more realistic and a preferred option.” [Comment: To the extent that the program is used a source for unskilled labor, it is easier to send the workers back home once they are no longer needed.]